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The Signaling Effect of Emission Taxes Under International Duopoly

机译：国际双头垄断下排放税的信号效应

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摘要

We analyze equilibrium emission taxes under international Cournot duopoly in the presence of asymmetric information between firms. When each firm does not know the production cost of its rival located in the other country, the government of each country can use its emission tax as a signal of the competitiveness of its domestic firm. We show that, owing to this signaling effect, the equilibrium emission tax and expected welfare of each country can be higher than those under symmetric information between firms or even higher than those obtained if the governments were to non-strategically set the tax rate equal to the (expected) marginal damage from pollution (i.e., the Pigouvian tax level). Our results suggest that the presence of asymmetric information between firms can mitigate a race to the bottom in strategic environmental policymaking.
机译：在企业之间存在不对称信息的情况下，我们分析了国际古诺双头垄断下的均衡排放税。当每个公司都不知道其竞争对手在另一个国家的生产成本时，每个国家的政府都可以将其排放税用作其国内公司竞争力的信号。我们表明，由于这种信号效应，每个国家的平衡排放税和预期福利可能高于企业之间对称信息下的平衡排放税和预期福利，甚至高于政府非战略性地将税率设定为等于污染造成的（预期）边际损害（例如，庇古税率）。我们的结果表明，企业之间不对称信息的存在可以减轻战略环境政策制定过程中的竞争。

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