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首页> 外文期刊>Environmental & Resource Economics >The Random Quantity Mechanism: Laboratory and Field Tests of a Novel Cost-Revealing Procurement Mechanism
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The Random Quantity Mechanism: Laboratory and Field Tests of a Novel Cost-Revealing Procurement Mechanism

机译：随机数量机制：一种新颖的成本披露采购机制的实验室和现场测试

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摘要

Information on private costs can improve the efficiency of programs that provide payment for environmental services in contexts involving information asymmetries and heterogeneous private costs. Using data from laboratory and field experiments, this paper presents and evaluates a novel private cost revealing mechanism, termed the random quantity mechanism (RQM), that can advance research in conservation contracting, payments for environmental services, and other similar settings. We examine the RQM's performance in a laboratory setting using induced costs and report results obtained from the first field implementation of this mechanism, with smallholder farmers in Zambia. We show that the RQM is incentive-compatible, that participant decision-making maximizes expected payoffs, and that the mechanism provides non-parametric estimates of private costs. The paper contributes to economic field studies by introducing a new incentive-compatible mechanism that elicits individuals' minimum willingness to accept across intensive margins, enabling researchers to estimate the supply of a service or commodity, and provides for exogenous variation in contract terms, which can aid in separately identifying the impacts of incentives and of participants' willingness to accept on contract outcomes.
机译：有关私人成本的信息可以提高在涉及信息不对称和异构私人成本的情况下为环境服务付款的计划的效率。本文使用实验室和现场实验的数据，提出并评估了一种新颖的私人成本揭示机制，称为随机数量机制（RQM），该机制可以促进保护合同，环境服务付款以及其他类似环境的研究。我们使用诱导成本在实验室环境中检验了RQM的性能，并报告了与赞比亚小农一起从该机制的首次实地实施中获得的结果。我们表明，RQM是激励兼容的，参与者的决策使预期收益最大化，并且该机制提供了私人成本的非参数估计。本文通过引入一种新的激励兼容机制为经济领域研究做出了贡献，该机制激发了个人在集约化利润空间内接受的最低意愿，使研究人员能够估算服务或商品的供应，并提供合同条款的外生变化。有助于分别确定激励措施和参与者接受合同的意愿的影响。

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