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Private Benefits of Conservation and Procurement Auction Performance

机译：保护和采购拍卖业绩的私人利益

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Payment-for-ecosystem services programs may use auctions to procure ecosystem services for cost-effective conservation. Conservation practices that generate private benefits (e.g., on-site benefits of erosion prevention) can reduce the effective cost of participation for landowners, and the inclusion of these services in the auction scoring criteria could increase overall cost-effectiveness for the buyer. However, the potential cost-effectiveness gain of including these private-benefit conservation practices may not be fully realized, as increased heterogeneity in the net cost of participation may reduce competition. Our induced-value laboratory experiment explores the impact of heterogeneous private benefits of conservation on auction cost-effectiveness when conservation practice choice is endogenous to offer formation. Heterogeneity in the private benefits of conservation across the landscape generates variation in competition levels across bidders that can lead to increased rent-seeking by bidders with substantial private benefits.
机译：按生态系统付费服务计划可以使用拍卖来采购生态系统服务，以实现具有成本效益的保护。产生私人利益（例如，防止侵蚀的现场利益）的保护实践可以降低土地所有者的有效参与成本，而将这些服务纳入拍卖评分标准可以提高买家的整体成本效益。但是，将这些私人利益保护措施包括在内的潜在成本效益收益可能无法完全实现，因为参与净成本中异质性的增加可能会减少竞争。当保护实践的选择是内生的提供形式时，我们的诱导值实验室实验探索了保护的异质私人利益对拍卖成本效益的影响。整个景观保护的私人利益的异质性导致投标人之间竞争水平的变化，这可能导致具有大量私人利益的投标人寻求更多的租金。

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