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首页> 外文期刊>Environmental & Resource Economics >Team Inspection in the Management of Common-Pool Resources When Corruption is Present
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Team Inspection in the Management of Common-Pool Resources When Corruption is Present

机译：存在腐败时在公共池资源管理中进行团队检查

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Corrupt enforcement of harvesting restrictions hampers the management of common-pool resources in many developing countries, contributing in particular to widespread illegal fishing and logging. In this paper, we examine a simple intervention that may mitigate the effects of such corruption if, as is often the case due to congestion, stock, or pecuniary externalities, harvesters' effort levels are strategic substitutes (i.e., greater effort by one harvester reduces the payoff to effort by other harvesters). We show that in this case, rather than sending out inspectors individually to each inspect a small subset of harvesters, sending them out as teams, whereby each team inspects a larger subset of harvesters, may be welfare enhancing. More specifically, we show that inspectors working in teams internalize more of the negative effort externalities between harvesters, and as a result choose to inspect more intensively, which ultimately reduces excessive harvest levels. Numerical simulations calibrated to data on fisheries indicate that the resulting welfare improvement can be significant.
机译：在许多发展中国家，腐败执法的收成执法受阻，阻碍了公共资源的管理，特别是造成了广泛的非法捕捞和伐木。在本文中，我们研究一种简单的干预措施，如果在通常情况下（由于拥堵，库存或金钱外部性所致）收割者的努力水平是战略替代品（例如，一个收割者的更大努力减少了收成，则可以减轻这种腐败的影响）其他收割机付出的努力）。我们表明，在这种情况下，与其单独派遣检查员给每个检查收获者的一小部分，而不是将他们作为团队发送出去，从而使每个团队检查更大一部分的收获者，不如说是提高了福利。更具体地说，我们表明，团队中的检查员内部化了收割机之间更多的负面努力外部性，因此选择进行更深入的检查，最终减少了过多的收割水平。对渔业数据进行校准的数值模拟表明，由此带来的福利改善可能是重大的。

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