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Sharing a Groundwater Resource in a Context of Regime Shifts

机译:在政权班次的背景下共享地下水资源

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We study the occurrence of shocks in a common groundwater resource problem using a differential game. In particular, we use Rubio and Casino's adaptation of the Gisser and Sanchez model where we introduce a sudden change in the dynamics of the resource, namely a decrease in the recharge rate of the aquifer. We compare the pareto optimal solution with open-loop and feedback equilibria. First, we show analytically how different solutions, at the steady state, depend on the intensity of the shock. Moreover, we show that the cost and the strategic effects are decreasing functions of the intensity of the shock, i.e. that all the solutions get closer at the steady state for more intense shocks. We finally apply the game to the particular case of the Western La Mancha aquifer. The aim of this application is to estimate how shocks influence the inefficiency of open loop and feedback strategies in terms of welfare. We show that this inefficiency decreases the earlier the shock occurs or the higher the intensity of the shock.
机译:我们使用差异游戏研究了共同的地下水资源问题中的冲击发生。特别是,我们使用Rubio和Casino对百秀和Sanchez模型的适应,在那里我们在资源的动态突然发生了突然变化,即含水层的充电率的降低。我们将帕累托最优解决方案与开环和反馈均衡进行比较。首先,我们在分析上展示了如何在稳定状态下的不同解决方案取决于冲击的强度。此外,我们表明成本和战略效果正在降低震动强度的功能,即,所有解决方案都在稳定状态下更接近以获得更强烈的冲击。我们终于将游戏应用于西拉曼特拉含水层的特定案例。本申请的目的是估计冲击如何影响福利方面的开放环路和反馈策略的效率。我们表明,这种低效减少了较早的冲击发生或震荡强度越高。

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