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Optimal Environmental Border Adjustments Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

机译：关税及贸易总协定下的最佳环境边界调整

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摘要

A country choosing to adopt border carbon adjustments based on embodied emissions is motivated by both environmental and strategic incentives. We argue that the strategic component is inconsistent with commitments under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). We extend the theory of border adjustments to neutralize the strategic incentive, and consider the remaining environmental incentive in a simplified structure. The theory supports border adjustments on carbon content that are below the domestic carbon price, because price signals sent through border adjustments inadvertently encourage consumption of emissions intensive goods in unregulated regions. The theoretic intuition is supported in our applied numeric simulations. Countries imposing border adjustments at the domestic carbon price will be extracting rents from unregulated regions at the expense of efficient environmental policy and consistency with international trade law.
机译：一个国家选择采用基于所体现的排放的边界碳调整的国家是由环境和战略激励措施的动机。我们认为，战略组成部分与“关税和贸易总协定”（GATT）的承诺不一致。我们扩展了边境调整理论以中和战略激励，并考虑简化结构中的剩余环境激励。该理论支持边境调整低于国内碳价格的碳含量，因为通过边境调整发出的价格信号无意中鼓励在不受管制的地区消耗排放集约化货物。我们应用的数字模拟中支持理论直觉。在国内碳价格上强加边境调整的国家将以有效的环境政策和国际贸易法的一致性提取不受管制的地区的租金。

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