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The Corona-Pandemic: A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Regional and Global Governance

机译：Corona-Pernemex：区域和全球治理的游戏理论观点

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摘要

We argue that the incentive structure of all individual and coordinated measures across countries to contain the corona-pandemic is that of a weakest-link public good game. We discuss a selection of theoretical and experimental key results of weakest-link games and interpret them in the light of the corona-pandemic. First, we highlight that experimental evidence does not support the assumption that coordination can be trivially solved, even among symmetric players. Second, we argue that for asymmetric countries the weakest-link game does not only pose a problem of coordination, but also a problem of cooperation. Third, we show how and under which conditions self-enforcing treaties can foster coordination and cooperation. We account for the possibility that countries make mistakes when choosing their actions. Our discussion shows that North-South cooperation is relevant and likely to be self-enforcing and that regional cooperation, e.g., within the EU, will also be important.
机译：我们认为，各国各国的所有个人和协调措施的激励结构是遏制电晕大流行的是一个最薄弱的公共比赛。我们讨论了最薄弱的链接游戏的理论和实验关键结果的选择，并根据电晕大流行来解释它们。首先，我们强调了实验证据不支持这些假设，即使在对称玩家中也能够进行协调。其次，我们争辩说，对于不对称国家，最弱的链接游戏不仅构成了协调问题，而且也是一个合作问题。第三，我们展示了自我执行条约的条件如何以及下方可以促进协调与合作。我们考虑到各国在选择行动时犯错误的可能性。我们的讨论表明，南北合作是相关的，有可能是自我执行的，并且区域合作，例如，在欧盟内部，也将是重要的。

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