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首页> 外文期刊>Environmental & Resource Economics >Compensation Payments and Animal Disease: Incentivising Farmers Both to Undertake Costly On-farm Biosecurity and to Comply with Disease Reporting Requirements
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Compensation Payments and Animal Disease: Incentivising Farmers Both to Undertake Costly On-farm Biosecurity and to Comply with Disease Reporting Requirements

机译:补偿金和动物疾病:鼓励农民进行昂贵的农场生物安全措施并遵守疾病报告要求

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摘要

This paper examines the issue of compensation payments for farmers affected by an animal disease outbreak. Recent literature has questioned the scope for the widely used "single mechanism" of compensation payments to incentivise farmers both to undertake costly on-farm biosecurity and to comply with disease reporting requirements. This paper develops a simple theoretical model of the farmer's decision environment in this situation and uses a numerical analysis to illustrate both the potential for a range of levels of compensation payments to achieve this dual incentivising, and how this range is affected by changes in the parameter values of the farmer's decision environment. The findings of the paper are used to suggest a range of policy implications in relation to compensation payments in the UK.
机译:本文研究了受动物疾病暴发影响的农民的补偿金问题。最近的文献质疑广泛使用的补偿金“单一机制”的范围,以激励农民进行昂贵的农场生物安全和遵守疾病报告要求。本文建立了这种情况下农民决策环境的简单理论模型,并使用数值分析来说明实现这种双重激励的一系列补偿金的潜力,以及该范围如何受到参数变化的影响农民决策环境的价值。该论文的发现被用来建议英国有关补偿支付的一系列政策含义。

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