• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Environmental & Resource Economics >Environmental Protection for Sale: Strategic Green Industrial Policy and Climate Finance
【24h】

Environmental Protection for Sale: Strategic Green Industrial Policy and Climate Finance

机译：待售环境保护：绿色战略产业政策和气候融资

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

Industrial policy has long been criticized as subject to protectionist interests; accordingly, subsidies to domestic producers face disciplines under World Trade Organization agreements, without exceptions for environmental purposes. Now green industrial policy is gaining popularity as governments search for low-carbon solutions that also provide jobs at home. The strategic trade literature has largely ignored the issue of market failures related to green goods. I consider the market for a new environmental good (like low-carbon technology) whose downstream consumption provides external benefits (like reduced emissions). Governments may have some preference for supporting domestic production, such as by interest-group lobbying, introducing a political distortion in their objective function. I examine the national incentives and global rationales for offering production (upstream) and deployment (downstream) subsidies in producer countries, allowing that some of the downstream market may lie in nonregulating third-party countries. Restraints on upstream subsidies erode global welfare when environmental externalities are large enough relative to political distortions. Climate finance is an effective alternative if political distortions are large and governments do not undervalue carbon costs. Numerical simulations of the case of renewable energy indicate that a modest social cost of carbon can imply benefits from allowing upstream subsidies.
机译：长期以来，人们一直批评工业政策要遵守保护主义利益。因此，对国内生产者的补贴将面临世界贸易组织协议规定的约束，无一例外地出于环境目的。现在，随着政府寻求低碳解决方案并在国内提供工作的机会，绿色工业政策越来越受欢迎。战略贸易文献在很大程度上忽略了与绿色商品有关的市场失灵问题。我认为新的环境商品（如低碳技术）的市场，其下游消费可带来外部收益（如减少排放）。各国政府可能更倾向于支持国内生产，例如通过利益集团的游说，在其目标职能中引入政治扭曲。我研究了在生产国提供生产（上游）和部署（下游）补贴的国家激励措施和全球理由，以使某些下游市场可能位于非监管第三方国家。当环境外部性相对于政治扭曲而言足够大时，对上游补贴的限制会侵蚀全球福利。如果政治扭曲很大并且政府不会低估碳成本，那么气候融资是一种有效的选择。对可再生能源案例的数值模拟表明，适度的社会碳成本可以暗示可以从上游补贴中受益。

著录项

  • 来源
    《Environmental & Resource Economics》 |2017年第3期|553-575|共23页
  • 作者

    Fischer Carolyn;

  • 作者单位

    Resources Future Inc, 1616 P St NW, Washington, DC 20036 USA|FEEM, Venice, Italy|CESifo Res Network, Munich, Germany;

  • 收录信息
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号