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Cooperation and Competition in Climate Change Policies: Mitigation and Climate Engineering when Countries are Asymmetric

机译：气候变化政策中的合作与竞争：国家不对称时的缓解与气候工程

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摘要

We study a dynamic game of climate policy design in terms of emissions and solar radiation management (SRM) involving two heterogeneous countries or group of countries. Countries emit greenhouse gasses (GHGs), and can block incoming radiation by unilateral SRM activities, thus reducing global temperature. Heterogeneity is modelled in terms of the social cost of SRM, the environmental damages due to global warming, the productivity of emissions in terms of generating private benefits, the rate of impatience, and the private cost of geoengineering. We determine the impact of asymmetry on mitigation and SRM activities, concentration of GHGs, and global temperature, and we examinewhether a tradeoff actually emerges between mitigation and SRM. Our results could provide some insights into a currently emerging debate regarding mitigation and SRM methods to control climate change, especially since asymmetries seem to play an important role in affecting incentives for cooperation or unilateral actions.
机译：我们研究了涉及两个不同国家或国家组的排放和太阳辐射管理（SRM）方面的气候政策设计动态博弈。各国排放温室气体（GHG），并可以通过单方面SRM活动来阻止进入的辐射，从而降低全球温度。异质性是根据SRM的社会成本，由于全球变暖造成的环境损害，就产生私人利益而言的排放量生产率，急躁程度以及地球工程的私人成本建模的。我们确定了不对称性对缓解和SRM活动，温室气体浓度和全球温度的影响，并研究了缓解和SRM之间是否真正出现了权衡。我们的研究结果可以为当前有关控制气候变化的缓解措施和SRM方法的辩论提供一些见识，尤其是因为不对称现象似乎在影响合作动机或单方面行动方面起着重要作用。

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