The Spillover Effects of Good Governance in a Tax Competition Framework with a Negative Environmental Externality

Batina Raymond G.; Galinato Gregmar I.

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The Spillover Effects of Good Governance in a Tax Competition Framework with a Negative Environmental Externality

机译：环境负外部性的税收竞争框架中善治的溢出效应

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We investigate the impact of a political regime shift affecting consumers, business interests and lobby contributions when countries engage in tax competition in capital and a polluting resource. When consumers have more influence than resource owners, the resource tax rate and public spending rise while environmental damages, lobbying contribution, and the capital tax rate fall. This response can spillover to other countries leading to lower welfare. Capital tax harmonization improves welfare of consumers and resource owners. Resource tax harmonization and governance harmonization both reduce the influence of lobbying and improve consumer welfare but resource owners are worse off.

机译：我们调查了当国家参与资本和污染性资源的税收竞争时，政治制度转变对消费者，商业利益和游说贡献的影响。当消费者比资源所有者更具影响力时，资源税率和公共支出会上升，而环境损害，游说贡献和资本税率会下降。这种反应可能会扩散到其他国家，导致福利降低。统一资本税可以提高消费者和资源所有者的福利。资源税的统一和治理的统一既减少了游说的影响，也改善了消费者的福利，但是资源所有者的处境更糟。

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《Environmental & Resource Economics》 |2017年第4期|701-724|共24页
作者
Batina Raymond G.; Galinato Gregmar I.;
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作者单位

Washington State Univ, Sch Econ Sci, Pullman, WA 99164 USA;

Washington State Univ, Sch Econ Sci, Pullman, WA 99164 USA;

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原文格式 PDF
正文语种 eng
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关键词
Lobbying; Environmental damage; Tax competition; Spillovers;

机译：游说;环境破坏;税收竞争;溢出;

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The Spillover Effects of Good Governance in a Tax Competition Framework with a Negative Environmental Externality

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