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Escape from Third-Best: Rating Emissions for Intensity Standards

机译：逃脱三等奖：强度标准的额定排放

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摘要

An increasingly common type of environmental policy instrument regulates the carbon intensity of transportation and electricity markets. In order to extend the policy's scope beyond point-of-use emissions, regulators assign each potential fuel an emission intensity rating for use in calculating compliance. I show that welfare-maximizing ratings do not generally coincide with the best estimates of actual emissions. In fact, the regulator can achieve a higher level of welfare by properly selecting the emission ratings than possible by selecting only the level of the standard. Moreover, a fuel's optimal rating can actually decrease when its estimated emission intensity increases. Numerical simulations of the California Low-Carbon Fuel Standard suggest that when recent scientific information increased the estimated emissions from conventional ethanol, regulators should have lowered ethanol's rating (making it appear less emission-intensive) so that the fuel market would clear with a lower quantity.
机译：越来越常见的环境政策工具规定了运输和电力市场的碳强度。为了将政策的范围扩展到使用点排放之外，监管机构为每种潜在燃料分配了一种排放强度等级，用于计算合规性。我表明，福利最大化的评级通常与实际排放的最佳估计不一致。实际上，与仅选择标准级别相比，通过适当选择排放等级，监管机构可以实现更高的福利水平。此外，当燃料的估计排放强度增加时，其最佳额定值实际上会降低。加利福尼亚低碳燃料标准的数值模拟表明，当最近的科学信息增加了常规乙醇的估计排放量时，监管机构应降低乙醇的等级（使其显得排放强度较低），以便燃料市场能够以较低的数量清除。

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