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首页> 外文期刊>Environmental & Resource Economics >Why are Fishers not Enforcing Their Marine User Rights?
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Why are Fishers not Enforcing Their Marine User Rights?

机译：为什么渔民不执行其海洋使用者权利？

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摘要

Over-fishing is a global problem that damages the marine environment and compromises the long-term sustainability of fisheries. This damage can be mitigated by restricting catch or other activities which can occur in marine areas. However, such management is only effective when restrictions are enforced to ensure compliance. We expect fishers to help enforce restrictions when they have exclusive user rights and can capture the benefits of management. In a number of such cases, however, fisher participation in the enforcement of user rights is absent. In this analysis we used central Chile as a case-study to investigate why some fishers may not participate in enforcement even when they have exclusive territorial user rights for fisheries. We used a best-worst scaling survey to assess why fishers would choose not to participate in enforcement through monitoring their TURF management areas, and what would help to increase their participation. We found that the main reason fishers may not monitor is because they consider government policing of marine areas and punishment of poachers to be ineffective. Increased and timely responsiveness by government when poachers are detected and more stringent penalisation of poachers may lead to greater involvement in enforcement by fishers.
机译：过度捕捞是一个全球性问题，它破坏了海洋环境并损害了渔业的长期可持续性。通过限制可能在海域发生的渔获物或其他活动，可以减轻这种破坏。但是，这种管理仅在强制执行限制以确保合规性时才有效。我们希望渔民在拥有专有用户权限时可以帮助实施限制，并可以从管理中受益。但是，在许多这样的情况下，渔民没有参与执行用户权利。在此分析中，我们使用智利中部地区作为案例研究，研究了为什么某些渔民即使拥有渔业的专属领土使用权也可能不参与执法。我们使用了最糟糕的规模调查来评估为什么渔民会通过监视其TURF管理区域来选择不参与执法，以及有哪些措施有助于增加其参与度。我们发现，渔民可能不进行监视的主要原因是因为他们认为政府对海洋地区的维持治安和对偷猎者的惩罚是无效的。当发现盗猎者时，政府会增加及时的响应，对盗猎者的更严厉处罚可能导致渔民更多地参与执法。

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  • 来源
    《Environmental & Resource Economics》 |2017年第4期|661-681|共21页
  • 作者

    Davis Katrina J.; Kragt Marit E.; Gelcich Stefan; Burton Michael; Schilizzi Steven; Pannell David J.;

  • 作者单位

    Univ Western Australia, Sch Agr & Resource Econ, Ctr Environm Econ & Policy, M089,35 Stirling Highway, Crawley, WA 6009, Australia|Univ Queensland, Ctr Excellence Environm Decis, St Lucia, Qld 4072, Australia;

    Univ Western Australia, Sch Agr & Resource Econ, Ctr Environm Econ & Policy, M089,35 Stirling Highway, Crawley, WA 6009, Australia;

    Pontificia Univ Catolica Chile, Fac Ciencias Biol, Dept Ecol, Ctr Appl Ecol & Sustainabil CAPES, Santiago, Chile|Pontificia Univ Catolica Chile, Fac Ciencias Biol, Dept Ecol, Ctr Conservac Marina, Santiago, Chile|Univ Calif Santa Barbara, Bren Sch Environm Sci & Management, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA;

    Univ Western Australia, Sch Agr & Resource Econ, Ctr Environm Econ & Policy, M089,35 Stirling Highway, Crawley, WA 6009, Australia;

    Univ Western Australia, Sch Agr & Resource Econ, Ctr Environm Econ & Policy, M089,35 Stirling Highway, Crawley, WA 6009, Australia;

    Univ Western Australia, Sch Agr & Resource Econ, Ctr Environm Econ & Policy, M089,35 Stirling Highway, Crawley, WA 6009, Australia;

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  • 正文语种 eng
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  • 关键词

    Best-worst scaling; Chile; Marine management; Monitoring; Small-scale fisheries; TURFs;

    机译：最坏结垢;智利;海洋管理;监测;小型渔业;TURF;

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