• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Environmental & Resource Economics >Self-Enforcing Intergenerational Social Contracts for Pareto Improving Pollution Mitigation
【24h】

Self-Enforcing Intergenerational Social Contracts for Pareto Improving Pollution Mitigation

机译：自我执行的代际社会契约以帕累托改善污染缓解

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

We consider, in an overlapping generations model with an environmental externality, a scheme of contracts between any two successive generations. Under each contract, agents of the young generation invest a share of their labor income in pollution mitigation in exchange for a transfer in the second period of their lives. The transfer is financed in a pay-as-you-go manner by the next young generation. Different from previous work we assume that the transfer is granted as a subsidy to capital income rather than lump sum. We show that the existence of a contract which is Pareto improving over the situation without contract for any two generations requires a sufficiently high level of income. In a steady state with social contracts in each period, the pollution stock is lower compared to a steady state without contracts. Analytical and numerical analysis of the dynamics under Nash bargaining suggests that under reasonable conditions, also steady state income and welfare are higher. Delaying the implementation of a social contract for too long or imposing a contract with too low mitigation can be costly: Net income may inevitably fall below the threshold in finite time so that Pareto improving mitigation is no longer possible and the economy converges to a steady state with high pollution stock and low income and welfare. In the second part of the paper, we study a game theoretic setup, taking into account that credibly committing to a contract might not be possible. We show that with transfers granted as a subsidy to capital income, there exist mitigation transfer schemes which are both Pareto improving and give no generation an incentive to deviate from any of its contracts even in a dynamically efficient economy. Social contracts coexist with private savings.
机译：在具有环境外部性的重叠世代模型中，我们考虑了任意两个连续世代之间的契约方案。根据每份合同，年轻一代的代理人将其劳动收入的一部分投资于缓解污染，以换取他们生命第二阶段的转移。下一代年轻人可以按需付费的方式进行转帐。与以前的工作不同，我们假设转移是作为资本收入的补贴而不是一次性支付的。我们证明，存在帕累托合同，在任何两代人都没有合同的情况下，其状况得到了改善，这需要足够高的收入水平。在每个时期都有社会契约的稳定状态下，与没有契约的稳定状态相比，污染存量较低。对纳什议价机制的动力学进行的分析和数值分析表明，在合理的条件下，稳态收入和福利也较高。将社会合同的执行时间拖延太长或实施缓解措施过低的合同可能会付出巨大的代价：净收入在有限时间内不可避免地会降至阈值以下，因此不再有帕累托改善缓解措施的可能性，经济会趋于稳定状态污染存量高，收入和福利低。在本文的第二部分，我们研究了博弈论的设置，同时考虑到可能不可能可靠地履行合同。我们证明，以转移支付作为对资本收入的补贴，存在缓解转移计划，这些转移计划不仅改善了帕累托，而且即使在动态高效的经济中，也没有一代人有动力偏离其任何合同。社会契约与私人储蓄并存。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号