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Climate Coalition Formation When Players are Heterogeneous and Inequality Averse

机译：参与者异质且不平等时的气候联盟形成

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In this paper, we study the formation of international climate coalitions in the case players are perfectly heterogeneous and inequality averse. The paper provides an analytical solution for the optimal contribution of an arbitrary coalition member to a linear and pure public good. Based on empirical estimates for the parameters the model is then applied to the problem of climate mitigation policies. We provide a full stability analysis of all coalitions that can be formed by the twelve world regions from Nordhaus' RICE model. As it turns out, only four two-player coalitions are internally stable. For a wealthy country leaving a coalition, its absolute payoff increases more than its disutility from additional advantageous inequality. A poor country improves its welfare by dropping out since its absolute payoff increases and, at the same time, disutility from disadvantageous inequality is reduced. Introducing suitable transfer schemes, however, large coalitions consisting of economically divergent countries turn out to be internally stable.
机译：在本文中，我们研究了国际气候联盟在参与者完全异质且避免不平等的情况下的形成。本文为任意联盟成员对线性和纯公共物品的最佳贡献提供了一种分析解决方案。基于对参数的经验估计，然后将该模型应用于气候缓解政策问题。我们根据Nordhaus的RICE模型对十二个世界地区可能形成的所有联盟提供完整的稳定性分析。事实证明，只有四个两人联盟内部稳定。对于一个离开联盟的富裕国家而言，其绝对收益增加的程度超过了因其他有利不平等而造成的无用功。贫穷的国家由于绝对收益增加而辍学，从而改善了其福利，同时减少了不利的不平等带来的无用功。但是，通过引入适当的转移计划，由经济上各不相同的国家组成的大型联盟内部是稳定的。

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