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Optimal Emission Tax with Endogenous Location Choice of Duopolistic Firms

机译：具有双寡头企业内生位置选择的最优排放税

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摘要

This study explores an optimal (pre-committed or ex-ante) environmental tax policy in a three-stage game in which polluting firms strategically choose the location of their plants after the government has chosen the optimal emission tax rate. We show not only that the optimal emission tax is non-decreasing with the declining cost of relocation (e.g., setup or fixed costs), or else, the progress of globalization but also that the firms may move back their relocated plants to the home country, causing the resulting welfare to decline. As a consequence, the domestic welfare varies in a non-monotonic way. We also show that such a counterintuitive non-monotonic relationship does not arise under time-consistent (ex-post) emission taxes.
机译：这项研究在一个三阶段博弈中探索了一种最佳（预先承诺或事前）环境税政策，其中污染企业在政府选择了最佳排放税率之后从战略上选择了工厂所在地。我们不仅证明最佳排放税不会随着搬迁成本（例如安装或固定成本）的下降而减少，或者随着全球化的进展，而且企业还可能将其搬迁的工厂迁回本国，导致福利下降。结果，家庭福利以非单调的方式变化。我们还表明，在时间一致的（事后）排放税下不会出现这种违反直觉的非单调关系。

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