...
  • 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Environmental & Resource Economics >Farsightedness in a Coalitional Great Fish War
【24h】

Farsightedness in a Coalitional Great Fish War

机译：联盟大鱼战中的远见

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

We explore the implications of the farsightedness assumption on the conjectures of players in a coalitional Great Fish War model with symmetric players, derived from the seminal model of Levhari and Mirman (Bell J Econ 11:649-661, 1980). The farsightedness assumption for players in a coalitional game acknowledges the fact that a deviation from a single player will lead to the formation of a new coalition structure as the result of possibly successive moves of her rivals in order to improve their payoffs. It departs from mainstream game theory in that it relies on the so-called rational conjectures, as opposed to the traditional Nash conjectures formed by players on the behavior of their rivals. For values of the biological parameter and the discount factor more plausible than the ones used in the current literature, the farsightedness assumption predicts a wide scope for cooperation in non-trivial coalitions, sustained by credible threats of successive deviations that defeat the shortsighted payoff of any prospective deviator. Compliance or deterrence of deviations may also be addressed by acknowledging that information on the fish stock or on the catch policies actually implemented may be available only with a delay (dynamic farsightedness). In that case, the requirements are stronger and the sizes and number of possible farsighted stable coalitions are different. In the sequential move version, which could mimic some characteristics of fishery models, the results are not less appealing, even if the dominant player or dominant coalition with first move advantage assumption provides a case for cooperation with the traditional Nash conjectures.
机译：我们探索远见假设对具有对称参与者的联合大鱼战争模型中的参与者猜想的影响，该模型取自Levhari和Mirman的开创性模型（Bell J Econ 11：649-661，1980）。联盟游戏中玩家的远见假设承认这样一个事实，即由于竞争者可能为了提高其收益而可能相继采取行动，因此与单个玩家的偏离会导致形成新的联盟结构。它与主流博弈论不同，它依赖于所谓的理性猜想，而不是玩家根据其竞争对手的行为形成的传统纳什猜想。由于生物学参数值和折现因子的值比当前文献中的值更合理，远见度假设预测，在非平凡联盟中，合作的广阔范围将受到连续偏差的可靠威胁的支持，这些冲突会击败任何形式的短视收益准偏向。也可以通过承认关于鱼类种群或实际实施的捕捞政策的信息可能只有延迟才能获得（动态远见），从而解决偏差的依从性或威慑力。在那种情况下，要求会更高，可能的有远见的稳定联盟的规模和数量也会有所不同。在可以模仿渔业模式某些特征的顺序移动方式中，即使具有先发优势假设的主导者或主导联盟为与传统纳什猜想的合作提供了理由，其结果也同样具有吸引力。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号