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Conservation Auctions and Compliance: Theory and Evidence from Laboratory Experiments

机译:保护性拍卖和合规性:来自实验室实验的理论和证据

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摘要

Many agri-environmental conservation programs are faced with the problem of imperfect monitoring. This provides farmers with an incentive for noncompliance, because they can receive subsidies without implementing the conservation scheme. In this paper, bidding behavior and auction performance are compared for discriminatory-price and uniform-price auctions in an imperfect monitoring environment. Our theoretical analysis suggests that auction performances are equalized between the discriminatory-price and uniform-price auctions. However, laboratory experiments reveal that, although the discrimi-natory-price auction has an advantage in terms of reducing policy costs, it is more likely to cause adverse selection. As a result, the uniform-price auction tends to have higher efficiency and cost-effectiveness when compliance behavior is taken into account.
机译:许多农业环境保护计划都面临着监测不完善的问题。这为农民提供了违规的诱因,因为他们可以在不执行保护计划的情况下获得补贴。在本文中,比较了在不完善的监控环境下针对歧视性价格拍卖和统一价格拍卖的出价行为和拍卖表现。我们的理论分析表明,在区分价格的拍卖和统一价格的拍卖之间,拍卖表现是均衡的。但是,实验室实验表明,尽管区分价格拍卖在降低政策成本方面具有优势,但它更有可能引起逆向选择。结果,当考虑到合规行为时,统一价格拍卖倾向于具有更高的效率和成本效益。

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