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Rapacious Resource Depletion, Excessive Investment and Insecure Property Rights: A Puzzle

机译:贪婪的资源枯竭,投资过多和不安全的产权:一个难题

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摘要

For a country fractionalized in competing factions, each owning part of the stock of natural exhaustible resources, or with insecure property rights, we analyze how resources are transformed into productive capital to sustain consumption. We allow property rights to improve as the country transforms natural resources into capital. The ensuing power struggle about the control of resources is solved as a non-cooperative differential game. Prices of resources and depletion increase faster than suggested by the Hotelling rule, especially with many competing factions and less secure property rights. As a result, the country substitutes away from resources to capital too rapidly and invests more than predicted by the Hartwick rule. The theory suggests that power struggle boosts output but depresses aggregate consump tion and welfare, especially in highly fractionalized countries with less secure property rights. Also, adjusted net saving estimates calculated by the World Bank using market prices over estimate welfare-based measures of genuine saving. Since our theory suggests that genuine saving is zero while empirically they are negative in resource-rich, fractionalized countries, we suggest ways of resolving this puzzle.
机译:对于一个在竞争派系中分裂的国家,每个派系拥有自然可耗尽资源,或者拥有不安全的产权,我们将分析如何将资源转化为生产性资本以维持消费。随着国家将自然资源转化为资本,我们允许改善产权。随之而来的关于资源控制的权力斗争被解决为一种非合作的差异博弈。资源价格和损耗的增长速度比霍特林定律所建议的要快,尤其是在竞争激烈的派系和产权较弱的情况下。结果,该国太快地从资源代替资本替代了资本,并且投资超过了哈特威克法则所预期的。该理论表明,权力斗争可以提高产出,但会降低总的消费和福利,尤其是在那些产权不安全的高度分散的国家。此外,世界银行使用市场价格计算出的调整后净储蓄估算值超过了基于福利的真实储蓄估算值。由于我们的理论表明,在资源丰富,分散的国家中,真正的储蓄为零,而根据经验它们却为负,因此我们建议了解决此难题的方法。

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