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Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements

机译：自愿执行环境协议的代价高昂

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摘要

We examine the consequences of costly enforcement on the ability of voluntary agreements with industries to meet regulatory objectives, the levels of industry participation with these agreements, and the relative efficiency of voluntary and regulatory approaches. A voluntary agreement can be more efficient in reaching an aggregate emissions target than a conventional emissions tax, but only if: (1) profitable voluntary agreements in which members of the agreement pay for its enforcement exist; (2) members of a voluntary agreement actually bear the costs of enforcing the agreement; (3) the agreement is enforced by a third-party, not the government, and (4) this third-party enforcer has a significant advantage in monitoring technology and/or available sanctions over the government.
机译：我们研究了成本高昂的执法对与行业达成自愿性协议以达到监管目标的能力，行业对这些协议的参与程度以及自愿性和监管方法的相对效率的后果。自愿协议可以比常规排放税更有效地实现总排放目标，但前提是：（1）存在由协议成员为执行费用付费的有利可图的自愿协议； （2）自愿协议的成员实际承担执行协议的费用； （3）该协议由第三方而非政府强制执行，并且（4）该第三方强制执行者在监控技术和/或对政府的可用制裁方面具有显着优势。

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