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Asymmetric Regulation of Identical Polluters in Oligopoly Models

机译：寡头垄断模型中相同污染物的不对称调控

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Studies of optimal second-best environmental regulation of identical polluting agents have invariably ignored potentially welfare-improving asymmetric regulation by imposing equal regulatory treatment of identical firms at the outset. Yet, cost asymmetry between oligopoly firms may well give rise to private as well as social gains. A trade-off is demonstrated for the regulator, between private costs savings and additional social costs when asymmetric treatment is allowed. Asymmetry is indeed optimal for a range of plausible parameter values. Further, it is demonstrated that for a broad class of abatement cost functions, there is scope for increasing welfare while keeping both total output and total emission constant. Some motivating policy issues are discussed in light of the results, including international harmonization and global carbon dioxide reduction.
机译：通过一开始就对同一公司实施平等的监管，对同一污染物的最佳第二环境监管的研究始终都忽略了可能改善福利的不对称监管。然而，寡头公司之间的成本不对称可能会带来私人收益以及社会收益。在允许不对称待遇的情况下，向监管者展示了在私人成本节省与额外社会成本之间的权衡。对于一系列合理的参数值，不对称确实是最佳的。进一步地，证明了对于宽泛的减排成本函数，存在在增加总产量和总排放量不变的同时增加福利的余地。根据结果​​讨论了一些激励政策问题，包括国际协调和全球二氧化碳减排。

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