...
  • 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Environmental & Resource Economics >Entitling the Pollutee: Liability versus Standard under Private Information
【24h】

Entitling the Pollutee: Liability versus Standard under Private Information

机译：激励污染者：私人信息下的责任与标准

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

This paper considers and compares two different legal means - full liability and standard - to reduce and to regulate pollution at a local level accounting for private information about benefits and costs. The familiar polluter pays principle makes the polluter liable for any damage. Since the courts lack information about the true damage the pollutee can and presumably will overstate this damage. Nevertheless, voluntary arrangements bypassing the courts exist (e.g., for Coasean reasons). However, such out-of court arrangements fail to improve in many cases the inefficient allocation of pollution due to agency costs. Given these unsatisfactory consequences of the polluter pays principle even after allowing for contracts around the law, we propose a modification of standards: the pollutee is entitled that a certain standard is satisfied, yet can trade this right for financial compensations. Contracts induced by this legal rule are countervailing (the optimal mechanism switches between subsidies and payments and first best efficiency holds at both ends) and this characteristic allows such a "privatized" standard to track the first best quite well and (often) better than the polluter pays principle. This relative ranking under private information is the opposite of the one that holds under uncertainty (here liability dominates the standard).
机译：本文考虑并比较了两种不同的法律手段-全额责任和标准-减少和规范地方一级的污染，以反映有关收益和成本的私人信息。熟悉的污染者付费原则使污染者对任何损害负责。由于法院缺乏有关真正损害的信息，因此被污染者可能并且可能会夸大这种损害。然而，仍然存在绕过法院的自愿安排（例如，出于科阿桑的原因）。但是，这种庭外安排在许多情况下都无法改善由于代理成本导致的污染分配效率低下的问题。考虑到即使在按照法律允许合同之后，污染者付费原则所带来的这些令人不满意的后果，我们还是建议对标准进行修改：被污染者有权满足一定的标准，但可以将这项权利用于经济补偿。由该法律规则产生的合同是反补贴的（最优机制在补贴和支付之间切换，并且两端都保持第一最佳效率），并且该特征允许这种“私有化”标准能够很好地跟踪（并且）优于污染者付费原则。私人信息下的这种相对排名与不确定性下的相对排名相反（此处责任主导标准）。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号