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Incomplete Enforcement of Pollution Regulation: Bargaining Power of Chinese Factories

机译：不完全执行污染法规：中国工厂的议价能力

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摘要

Only a limited number of papers have empirically examined the determinants of the monitoring and enforcement activities performed by the environmental regulator. Moreover, most of these studies have taken place in the context of developed countries. In this paper, we empirically examine the determinants of the enforcement of pollution charges in China. More precisely, we seek to identify the characteristics which may give firms more or less bargaining power with local environmental authorities pertaining to the enforcement (collection) of pollution charges. Firms from the private sector appear to have less bargaining power than state-owned enterprises. Firms facing an adverse financial situation also appear to have more bargaining power. Finally, we also show that the higher the social impact of a firm's emissions (as measured by the presence of complaints), the smaller the bargaining power of the firms with local environmental authorities.
机译：仅有限数量的论文凭经验检查了环境监管机构进行的监视和执法活动的决定因素。此外，这些研究大多数是在发达国家的背景下进行的。在本文中，我们从经验上考察了中国实施污染收费的决定因素。更确切地说，我们力求找出可以赋予企业与地方环境主管部门有关污染收费的执行（征收）的议价能力的特征。私营企业的议价能力似乎比国有企业低。面临不利财务状况的公司似乎也具有更大的议价能力。最后，我们还表明，企业排放的社会影响力越高（通过投诉的存在来衡量），企业与当地环境主管部门的讨价还价能力就越小。

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