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Auction Design for the Allocation of Emission Permits in the Presence of Market Power

机译：在市场力量存在下分配排放许可证的拍卖设计

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To the extent that emission permits have been allocated using market mechanisms, this has been done using a sealed-bid auction design, typically with discriminatory prices. However, several authors have recommended the ascending auction format. Basically, two "competing" ascending auction designs have been suggested, the standard ascending auction (with clock or demand schedules), or an alternative ascending-clock implementation of Vickrey-pricing. The latter design was introduced as a response to problems of bid shading under the sealed-bid and the standard ascending auction format. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the allocation of permits under these two alternative mechanisms. The auction process and the resulting market outcome in the presence of oligopolistic competition are simulated. In this setting, it is not obvious that bid shading is the optimal strategy under the standard design, nor is it obvious that sincere bidding is the optimal strategy under the alternative ascending auction design. The alternative auction format makes it less costly to pursue a strategy to increase market shares through the acquisition of emission permits, thus increasing the competitor's costs, leading to overbidding as the optimal strategy.
机译：就使用市场机制分配排放许可证的程度而言，这是使用密封的拍卖设计完成的，通常采用具有歧视性的价格。但是，几位作者推荐了升序的拍卖形式。基本上，已经提出了两种“竞争性”的升序拍卖设计，即标准的升序拍卖（带有时钟或需求计划），或者是Vickrey定价的另一种升序实现。引入后一种设计是为了应对密封投标和标准递增拍卖格式下的投标遮挡问题。本文的目的是研究这两种替代机制下的许可证分配。模拟了寡头竞争情况下的拍卖过程和由此产生的市场结果。在这种情况下，标明阴影是标准设计下的最佳策略是不明显的，真诚的投标是替代性上升拍卖设计下的最优策略，也并不明显。替代性拍卖方式使通过获取排放许可证来提高市场份额的策略的成本降低，从而增加了竞争者的成本，导致竞价成为最优策略。

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