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首页> 外文期刊>European environmental law review >A Governance Perspective on the Choice between 'Cap and Trade' and 'Credit and Trade' for an Emissions Trading Regime
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A Governance Perspective on the Choice between 'Cap and Trade' and 'Credit and Trade' for an Emissions Trading Regime

机译：排放交易制度的“上限与交易”与“信用与交易”选择的治理视角

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This article discusses from a legal point of view an alternative approach towards allocating tradable greenhouse gas emission rights. The present EU greenhouse gas emission allowance trading regime starts from a decentralised allocation of emission rights, based on rather vague criteria stipulated in an annex to the greenhouse gas emissions trading Directive, and with much discretion left to the Member States. This approach, where most of the allowances are given free of charge to industries, entails that different amount of allowances are given to equal installations vested in different Member States, is vulnerable to lobbying activities, does not stimulate at full force new climate-friendly options, and moreover appears to be an administratively complex instrument. Because of the fact that the present method contains such disadvantages, there is a serious need for examining alternative options. Besides auctioning, which is thus far politically seen not attractive because of the negative effects on the global competitive position of industries, it is also interesting to examine the so-called "credit-and-trade" regime as being a possible future approach towards allocating greenhouse gas emission rights in Europe and probably on a wider scale too. This approach fits better into the polluter-pays principle, deals easily with new entrants and closures, and is a concept from which harmonisation within the EU could be realised. It also contains some regulatory complexities, as all allocation mechanisms do. However, the concept has strikingly been subject to little debate in the literature thus far, and the merits of it compared to the other methods of allocation should be closely examined too.
机译：本文从法律的角度讨论了分配可交易的温室气体排放权的另一种方法。当前的欧盟温室气体排放配额交易制度始于根据温室气体排放交易指令附件中规定的模糊标准，对排放权进行分散分配，并留给成员国很大的酌处权。这种向大多数行业免费提供配额的方法，意味着对归属于不同成员国的同等设施给予不同数量的配额，这种方法很容易受到游说活动的影响，不会全力刺激新的气候友好选择，而且似乎是一个管理上很复杂的工具。由于本方法具有这样的缺点，因此迫切需要研究替代方案。除了拍卖，到目前为止，由于对行业全球竞争地位的负面影响，拍卖在政治上没有吸引力，此外，将所谓的“信贷和贸易”制度作为未来可能的分配方法进行研究也很有趣。欧洲的温室气体排放权，也许还有更大的范围。这种方法更适合污染者付费的原则，可以轻松应对新进入者和关闭者，并且是可以实现欧盟内部协调的概念。正如所有分配机制一样，它也包含一些监管方面的复杂性。但是，迄今为止，这一概念在文献中很少受到争议，与其他分配方法相比，它的优点也应仔细研究。

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