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首页> 外文期刊>The European journal of finance >Can management-sponsored non-binding remuneration votes shape the executive compensation structure? Evidence from Say-on-Pay votes in Germany
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Can management-sponsored non-binding remuneration votes shape the executive compensation structure? Evidence from Say-on-Pay votes in Germany

机译：管理层赞助的无约束力的薪酬票能塑造高管薪酬结构吗？来自德国“按付款说”投票的证据

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摘要

In this paper, a hand-selected sample of 1676 annual general meetings with 268 management-sponsored Say-on-Pay votes in 164 different companies between 2010 and 2015 in the German two-tier system was analysed. The analysis focused on the structure, rather than the level, of executive compensation by applying a sample-selection model and panel data regression. Consistent with our hypotheses, shareholders favour long-term stock and stock option plans but oppose short-term cash-bonus payments. However, the positive effect of equity compensation decreases as the share of the total remuneration increases, suggesting that the alignment effect is limited. The negative effect of bonus payments on the voting results is stronger in cases in which the voting approval of the supervisory board is low. Thus, investors who are discontent with the bonus payments eventually punish the supervisory board in charge of negotiating the contract. The supervisory board reacts to such cases by reducing the bonuses and increasing the equity payments in the following year, but the total compensation or fixed annual salary is unaffected. Hence, Say-on-Pay in Germany affects the structure but not the level of compensation. The results show that shareholders assess the entire compensation structure and prefer a particular compensation mix. However, non-binding Say-on-Pay votes help to establish compensation schemes that are favoured by shareholders.
机译：本文分析了2010年至2015年间在德国两层系统中从164家不同公司中以268项管理层支持的“说支付”投票的1676项年度股东大会样本。通过应用样本选择模型和面板数据回归，分析着重于高管薪酬的结构而不是水平。与我们的假设一致，股东赞成长期股票和股票期权计划，但反对短期现金红利支付。但是，股权补偿的积极作用随着总薪酬份额的增加而降低，这表明结盟作用是有限的。在监事会投票赞成率低的情况下，奖金支付对投票结果的负面影响更大。因此，对红利支付不满意的投资者最终会惩罚负责合同谈判的监事会。监事会在第二年通过减少奖金和增加股本支付的方式对此作出反应，但总薪酬或固定年薪不受影响。因此，德国的“付款说”会影响结构，但不会影响补偿水平。结果表明，股东评估了整个薪酬结构，并偏爱特定的薪酬组合。但是，不具约束力的“立即付款”投票有助于建立受到股东青睐的薪酬计划。

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