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Split Share Structure Reform, corporate governance, and the foreign share discount puzzle in China

机译:股权分置改革,公司治理和中国外资股折价难题

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We examine the impact of the Split Share Structure Reform on the well-known foreign share discount puzzle in China. Existing literature confirms that foreign investors are more concerned about insider expropriation because of their information disadvantage relative to domestic investors. The split share structure of the ownership of Chinese listed firms created a conflict of interests between state and private shareholders. Since, before the reform, state shareholders held restricted shares that denied them any wealth effect from share price movements, they had a limited incentive to work with private shareholders to ensure that managers maximized the stock market value of the firm. By abolishing the trading restrictions for state shareholders, this reform has increased the incentive alignment between state and private shareholders, encouraging them to monitor managers. If foreign investors' concerns over the corporate governance implications of the split share structure at least partly contributed to their discounting of Chinese listed firms, then this discount should be reduced following the reform. Indeed, our evidence confirms this prediction, especially among Chinese listed firms with more state ownership or restricted shares. Our findings imply that this significant institutional reform of the Chinese stock market has benefitted minority investors.
机译:我们研究了股权分置改革对中国著名的外资股折价难题的影响。现有文献证实,外国投资者相对于国内投资者而言,由于其信息劣势而更加关注内部人被没收。中国上市公司所有权的股权分成结构造成了国有股东与私人股东之间的利益冲突。由于在改革之前,国有股东持有的限制性股票使他们无法享受股价波动带来的财富影响,因此他们与私人股东合作以确保经理人最大化公司股票市值的动力有限。通过取消对国有股股东的交易限制,这项改革提高了国有股股东和私人股东之间的激励一致性,鼓励他们监督管理者。如果外国投资者对股权分置对公司治理的担忧至少部分地导致了它们对中国上市公司的折价,那么在改革之后应减少这种折价。确实,我们的证据证实了这一预测,特别是在国有企业较多或股份有限的中国上市公司中。我们的发现表明,中国股市的这一重大机构改革使少数投资者受益。

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