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Political cycles and corruption in Russian regions

机译:俄罗斯地区的政治周期和腐败

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It has been established that opportunistic incumbent politicians, both elected and appointed, adjust public policies in systematic ways over political cycles. We show that the corrupt behavior of appointed politicians also follows certain patterns which are driven by political cycles. Based on BEEPS data, exploiting variation in the dates of surveys and in the starting dates of Russian regional governors' terms of office, we find that corruption levels, as perceived by firms operating in different regions of Russia, are higher closer to the end of a regional governor's term. We argue that such a pattern cannot be explained by standard political budget cycle reasoning, but rather that the observed pattern may be generated by governors' accumulation of private information about their likelihood of remaining in office for another term. When a governor gradually learns that he will not be re-appointed once his current term has expired, he has increasing incentives to engage in corrupt activities in order to accumulate wealth before his departure. Alternatively, when a governor becomes more certain that he will remain in office, he may have higher incentives to smooth rent extraction over time and thus not to increase it. We test this explanation in several ways and consistently find supporting evidence.
机译:已经确定的是,机会主义的现任政治家,无论是当选还是任命,都会在政治周期内以系统的方式调整公共政策。我们表明,任命政治家的腐败行为也遵循某些由政治周期驱动的模式。根据BEEPS数据,利用调查日期和俄罗斯区域州长任职起始日期的差异,我们发现,在俄罗斯不同地区开展业务的公司认为,腐败程度更高。地区长的任期。我们认为,这种模式无法用标准的政治预算周期推理来解释,而是观察到的模式可能是由州长积累的有关其任职可能性的私人信息积累而产生的。当州长逐渐了解到他的现任期满后将不再获得连任时,他就会越来越有动机从事腐败活动,以便在离任前积累财富。或者,当州长更确定自己将继续任职时,他可能会更有动力在一段时间内平稳地提取租金,从而不增加租金。我们以几种方式测试该解释,并不断找到支持证据。

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