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Contested Water Rights

机译:有争议的水权

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In many international river basins disputes over property rights to water lead to inefficient water allocation and a waste of resources. In this paper, we examine how contested water rights impede water trade. To show this, we use a model in which property rights to water are contested because countries have overlapping claims to water. In the model, countries decide whether to bargain over the allocation of contested river water or not. If not. they engage in conflict. In the conflict, countries spend their resources on production, which also requires water, or on fighting to secure part of the contested water. The resulting equilibrium is inefficient as both countries spend a positive amount of resources on fighting which is not productive. However, a third party may be requested to intervene in the looming conflict and allocate the water in an equitable way. The results show that for certain model parameters countries prefer not to bargain an efficient allocation, but to engage in conflict, hoping for third party intervention. The mere possibility of third party intervention may give rise to an inefficient equilibrium. Two new features of this paper are the application of a conflict model to the issue of water rights and the introduction of (overlapping) claims to non-cooperative bargaining problems.
机译:在许多国际流域,关于水的产权争端导致配水效率低下和资源浪费。在本文中,我们研究了有争议的水权如何阻碍水贸易。为了说明这一点,我们使用了一个模型,在该模型中,由于各国对水的权利主张重叠,因此对水的产权提出了质疑。在该模型中,各国决定是否就有争议的河水分配进行讨价还价。如果不。他们陷入冲突。在冲突中,各国将其资源用于生产,这也需要水,或用于争夺部分有争议水的斗争。由于两国都将大量资源用于生产效率低下的战斗,因此产生的均衡效率很低。但是,可能会要求第三方介入迫在眉睫的冲突并以公平的方式分配水。结果表明,对于某些模型参数,国家倾向于不讨价还价,而是进行冲突,希望有第三方干预。第三方干预的唯一可能性可能会导致效率低下的均衡。本文的两个新功能是将冲突模型应用于水权问题,以及将(重叠的)权利要求引入非合作议价问题。

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