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首页> 外文期刊>European journal of political economy >Are independent central banks really as conservative as they like to pretend?
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Are independent central banks really as conservative as they like to pretend?

机译：独立央行真的像他们所假装的那样保守吗？

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In a recent paper in this journal [Demertzis, M., Hughes Hallett, A., Viegi, N., 2004. An independent Central Bank faced with elected governments: European Journal of Political Economy 20, 907-922.] we showed that, when voting is endogenised, an independent and conservative Central Bank will create the tendency for elected governments to become more liberal or populist. That causes policies as well as preferences to diverge. But we did not show whether the Central Bank would then become more conservative in response, by way of disciplining the fiscal authority and protecting its own preferred targets. Building on these earlier results, we examine that question in this paper. I find that the Central Bank would, in its own interest, not retaliate in this fashion except where the government's target for output growth becomes very ambitious. This behaviour seems to match what little empirical evidence we have on Central Bank reactions.
机译：在该杂志的最近一篇论文中[Demertzis，M.，Hughes Hallett，A.，Viegi，N.，2004。面对当选政府的独立中央银行：《欧洲政治经济学期刊》 20，907-922。] ，当投票产生内生性时，独立而保守的中央银行将使民选政府趋向于变得更加自由或民粹主义。这导致政策和偏好有所不同。但是，我们没有表明中央银行是否会通过限制财政当局和保护自己的首选目标的方式而变得更加保守。基于这些早期结果，我们在本文中研究了这个问题。我发现，除非政府的产出增长目标变得雄心勃勃，否则中央银行不会出于自己的利益进行报复。这种行为似乎与我们对中央银行的反应几乎没有经验证据相符。

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