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首页> 外文期刊>European review of economic history >The limits to lender of last resort interventions in emerging economies: evidence from the Gold Standard and the Great Depression in Spain
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The limits to lender of last resort interventions in emerging economies: evidence from the Gold Standard and the Great Depression in Spain

机译：新兴经济体中最后贷款人干预措施的局限性：黄金标准和西班牙大萧条的证据

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Conventional accounts argue that Spain escaped the Great Depression because its currency was not convertible to gold. Accordingly, when a bank run ensued in 1931, the Banco de Espana would have been able to lend freely as lender of last resort. Drawing on new archival data on bank balance sheets and discount window borrowing, I show that rapid currency depreciation caused by the reversal in international capital flows that started in 1928 bounded monetary authorities to a dilemma between liquidity assistance and capital mobility during the 1931 crisis. These limits to policy reaction help explain the sharp contraction in bank lending and economic activity during and after 1931.
机译：传统说法认为，西班牙摆脱了大萧条，因为其货币无法兑换成黄金。因此，当1931年随后发生银行挤兑时，西班牙银行本可以作为最后贷款人自由放贷。利用银行资产负债表和贴现窗口借贷上的新档案数据，我表明，由1928年开始的国际资本流动逆转而导致的货币快速贬值，使货币当局陷入了1931年危机期间流动性援助与资本流动之间的困境。政策反应的这些限制有助于解释1931年及之后的银行贷款和经济活动急剧收缩。

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