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首页> 外文期刊>Expert Systems with Application >Pricing, collection, and effort decisions with coordination contracts in a fuzzy, three-level closed-loop supply chain
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Pricing, collection, and effort decisions with coordination contracts in a fuzzy, three-level closed-loop supply chain

机译：模糊，三级闭环供应链中带有协调合同的定价，收集和工作决策

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In this paper, a fuzzy, closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), with one manufacturer, one retailer and one collector, is investigated. The optimal decision problem is analyzed based on a fuzzy price and sales effort dependent demand to evaluate how members decide wholesale price, collection rate, retail price, and sales effort under different decision-making structures. Six game theory models are established and optimal solutions are extracted and compared by applying game and fuzzy theories. According to the results, collaboration between a manufacturer and retailer is favorable for both customers and the chain as a whole; the most effective model for collecting used products is collaboration between the manufacturer and collector. Finally, a practical, new channel coordination scheme is explored to match the performance of a decentralized CLSC to that of a centralized CLSC. The results illustrate that the proposed contract can effectively coordinate decentralized CLSCs. It is also beneficial from both consumer and environmental perspectives. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译：本文研究了一个具有一个制造商，一个零售商和一个收集者的模糊闭环供应链（CLSC）。基于模糊的价格和依赖于销售努力的需求来分析最优决策问题，以评估成员如何决定不同决策结构下的批发价，回收率，零售价和销售努力。建立了六个博弈模型，运用博弈论和模糊理论对最优解进行了提取和比较。根据结果​​，制造商和零售商之间的合作对客户和整个连锁店都有利；收集二手产品最有效的模型是制造商和收集者之间的协作。最后，探索了一种实用的新信道协调方案，以使分散式CLSC的性能与集中式CLSC的性能相匹配。结果表明，拟议合同可以有效地协调分散式CLSC。从消费者和环境的角度来看，这也是有益的。 （C）2018 Elsevier Ltd.保留所有权利。

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