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Utility-based double auction mechanism using genetic algorithms

机译：基于实用程序的遗传算法双拍卖机制

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摘要

Double auction refers to a market system where multiple buyers and sellers submit their bids for standardized units of well-defined items or securities by stating how much and at what price they will trade. In double auction, each trader can express the subjective preference for the traded goods by using a utility function. Thus, how to properly define the utility for representing each trader's preference is an important issue for research on double auction. Most of the previous studies on double auction just suggest linear or quasi-linear utility functions for traders and assume that buyers as well as sellers each have identical utility functions. However, in practice, each buyer and seller in a double auction market may have diverse utility functions for trading goods. Therefore, a flexible and integrated double auction mechanism that can integrate all traders' diverse utility functions is necessary. In particular, a flexible mechanism is more useful in a synchronous double auction because the participating traders can properly change utilities in each round of multiple bidding rounds. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a utility-based double auction mechanism, namely a flexible synchronous double auction system where participants can express diverse utility functions on goods for which they are bidding. In order to optimize the total market utility which consists of multiple complex utility functions of traders, this proposes a genetic algorithm (GA) as a tool for solving a nonlinear optimization model. We show the viability of the proposed mechanism through a web-based prototype system and empirical experiments.
机译：双重拍卖是指一种市场系统，其中多个买卖双方通过陈述要交易的价格和价格，为定义明确的物品或证券的标准化单位提交出价。在双重拍卖中，每个交易者可以使用效用函数来表达对所交易商品的主观偏好。因此，如何正确定义代表每个交易者偏好的效用是研究双重拍卖的重要问题。先前关于双重拍卖的大多数研究仅建议交易者使用线性或准线性效用函数，并假设买方和卖方都具有相同的效用函数。但是，实际上，双重拍卖市场中的每个买卖双方可能具有用于交易商品的多种效用功能。因此，有必要建立一个灵活，集成的双向拍卖机制，以整合所有交易者的各种效用功能。尤其是，灵活机制在同步双重拍卖中更有用，因为参与交易的交易者可以在多轮招标的每一轮中适当地改变效用。因此，在本文中，我们提出了一种基于效用的双拍卖机制，即一种灵活的同步双拍卖系统，参与者可以在要拍卖的商品上表达多种效用函数。为了优化由多个复杂效用函数组成的总市场效用，提出了一种遗传算法（GA）作为求解非线性优化模型的工具。我们通过基于Web的原型系统和经验实验证明了所提出机制的可行性。

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