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首页> 外文期刊>German economic review >Farmers' Adoption of Irrigation Technologies: Experimental Evidence from a Coordination Game with Positive Network Externalities in India
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Farmers' Adoption of Irrigation Technologies: Experimental Evidence from a Coordination Game with Positive Network Externalities in India

机译：农民采用灌溉技术：来自印度正网络外部性的协调博弈的实验证据

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摘要

Electric irrigation contributes to food security in rural India, but deteriorating electrical infrastructures threaten the functioning of farmers' pump sets. This problem could be solved through investments in energy-efficient technologies. However, network externalities create a coordination problem for farmers. We develop a framed field experiment to study the effects of group size, leading by example, and payoff structures on the ability to coordinate technology adoption investments. The experiment is based on a game that combines features of a step-level public goods game and a critical mass game. Our findings show that smaller groups more frequently coordinate on payoff-superior equilibria and that higher payoffs lead to more investments. Contrary to previous studies, leading by example reduces investments but has no effect on efficiency. Building on this analysis, we discuss possible bottom-up solutions to the energy crisis in rural India.
机译：电力灌溉为印度农村地区的粮食安全做出了贡献，但电力基础设施恶化威胁着农民的水泵机组的运转。这个问题可以通过投资节能技术来解决。但是，网络外部性给农民带来了协调问题。我们开发了一个框架化的现场实验，以研究团队规模（以身作则）和收益结构对协调技术采用投资的能力的影响。该实验基于一个结合了阶梯式公共物品游戏和临界大众游戏功能的游戏。我们的研究结果表明，较小的群体更频繁地协调收益优等的平衡，而更高的收益会带来更多的投资。与以前的研究相反，以身作则减少了投资，但对效率没有影响。在此分析的基础上，我们讨论了印度农村能源危机的自下而上的可能解决方案。

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