首页> 外文期刊>German economic review >Debt Brakes in the German States: Governments' Rhetoric and Actions
【24h】

Debt Brakes in the German States: Governments' Rhetoric and Actions

机译:德国的债务危机:政府的修辞和行动

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

In 2009, a new law on German debt brakes was passed: state governments are not allowed to run structural deficits after 2020. Consolidation strategies initiated between 2009 and 2020 influence if a state can comply with the debt brake in 2020. We describe to what extent government ideology predicts if state governments consolidate budgets and which fiscal adjustment path they choose. Attitudes toward budget consolidation, as expressed by politicians' rhetoric in the public debate, differed among parties. Anecdotal evidence and descriptive statistics indicate that leftwing governments ran on average higher structural deficits than rightwing governments between 2010 and 2014. Primary deficits, however, hardly differed under leftwing and rightwing governments. Revenues of federal taxes were much higher than expected and facilitated budget consolidation. Leftwing governments did not need to run deficits to design generous budgets. It is conceivable that parties confirmed their identity by using expressive rhetoric, but responded to shifts in public opinion after the financial crisis and pursued more sustainable fiscal policies when in office.
机译:2009年,通过了一部有关德国债务刹车的新法律:不允许州政府在2020年后出现结构性赤字。2009年至2020年之间发起的合并战略会影响一个州在2020年能否遵守债务刹车。我们描述了在何种程度上政府意识形态预测州政府是否会合并预算以及他们选择哪种财政调整路径。正如政客在公开辩论中的言论所表达的,各方对预算合并的态度有所不同。轶事证据和描述性统计数据表明,2010年至2014年间,左翼政府的结构性赤字平均水平高于右翼政府。然而,左翼政府和右翼政府之间的基本赤字几乎没有差异。联邦税收收入远高于预期,并促进了预算合并。左翼政府无需为设计慷慨的预算而出现赤字。可以想象,当事方使用表达性的言论来确认自己的身份,但在金融危机之后回应了舆论的转变,并在任职时奉行了更具可持续性的财政政策。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号