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首页> 外文期刊>German economic review >On the Political Economy of Public Deficits and Debt
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On the Political Economy of Public Deficits and Debt

机译：论公共赤字与债务的政治经济学

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摘要

In OECD countries, we have observed a considerable increase in public debt over recent decades caused by large and lasting deficits. What is the reason for this development and why is it rather different by country? There are two approaches to explain this. Traditional economic theory explains why it makes sense to allow deficits of public budgets in certain situations, which might result in a limited amount of public debt. It also shows the conditions for the sustainability of public finances namely that public debt stays below certain limits and, in particular, does not - in the long run - increase faster than GDP. Tollowing the recommendations of this approach, public budget surpluses should be run in economic upswings to compensate for deficits in recessions. By contrast, politico-economic approaches explain why democratic governments have incentives to allow deficits even in periods of economic upswings. In the long run, this can lead to ever-increasing public debt. To prevent this, institutional provisions are necessary. In this respect, Swiss debt brakes at the national and cantonal levels as well as the new German rules are of particular interest.
机译：在经合组织国家，我们观察到近几十年来由于巨额和持久的赤字而导致的公共债务显着增加。这种发展的原因是什么？为什么各国之间会有很大的不同？有两种方法可以解释这一点。传统经济学理论解释了为什么在某些情况下允许公共预算赤字是有意义的，这可能会导致有限的公共债务。它还显示了公共财政可持续性的条件，即公共债务保持在一定限度以下，特别是从长远来看，其增长速度不会超过GDP。根据这种方法的建议，公共预算盈余应在经济增长中运行，以弥补经济衰退中的赤字。相比之下，政治经济学方法解释了为什么民主政府即使在经济增长时期也有动机允许赤字。从长远来看，这可能导致公共债务不断增加。为防止这种情况，必须制定机构规定。在这方面，瑞士在国家和州一级的债务制止以及德国的新规定尤其令人关注。

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