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首页> 外文期刊>German economic review >Over- and Underbidding in Central Bank Open Market Operations Conducted as Fixed Rate Tender
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Over- and Underbidding in Central Bank Open Market Operations Conducted as Fixed Rate Tender

机译：以固定利率招标方式进行的中央银行公开市场操作中的出价过高和不足

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摘要

Open market operations play a key role in allocating central bank funds to the banking system and thereby in steering short-term interest rates in line with the stance of monetary policy. Many central banks apply so-called 'fixed rate tender' auctions in their open market operations. This paper presents, on the basis of a survey of central bank experience, a model of bidding in such tenders. In their conduct of fixed rate tenders, many central banks faced specifically an 'under-' and an 'overbidding' problem. These phenomena are revisited in the light of the proposed model, and the more general question of the optimal tender procedure and allotment policy of central banks is addressed.
机译：公开市场操作在将中央银行资金分配给银行系统，从而根据货币政策立场控制短期利率方面起着关键作用。许多中央银行在公开市场操作中采用所谓的“固定利率招标”拍卖。本文在对中央银行经验的调查基础上，提出了此类招标的竞标模型。许多中央银行在进行固定利率招标时，特别面临着“不足”和“过度招标”的问题。根据提出的模型重新审视了这些现象，并解决了中央银行最优招标程序和分配政策的更普遍的问题。

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