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首页> 外文期刊>German economic review >News Management in Monetary Policy: When Central Banks Should Talk to the Government
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News Management in Monetary Policy: When Central Banks Should Talk to the Government

机译：货币政策中的新闻管理：中央银行应何时与政府对话

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Central banks are often considered to be better informed about the present or future state of the economy than the government. A conservative central bank has an incentive to exploit this asymmetry by strategically managing its information policy. Strategic news management will keep the government uncertain about the state of the economy and increase the central bank's leeway for conducting a conservative monetary policy. We show that withholding information from the government is an equilibrium. However, there are also well-defined limits to strategic information policy as the central bank has to distort monetary policy to be in line with its news management. A simple extension of our findings is that, if the government on occasion learns about the bank's true information, it will then overrule the central bank's decision on monetary policy.
机译：人们通常认为中央银行比政府更了解当前或未来的经济状况。保守的中央银行有动机通过战略性地管理其信息政策来利用这种不对称性。战略性新闻管理将使政府不确定经济状况，并增加央行实施保守货币政策的余地。我们表明，从政府隐瞒信息是一种平衡。但是，由于中央银行必须扭曲货币政策以使其符合新闻管理，因此战略信息政策也有明确的限制。我们发现的一个简单扩展是，如果政府有时了解到银行的真实信息，那么它将推翻央行关于货币政策的决定。

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