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首页> 外文期刊>Global economic review >Do Institutional Investors Improve Corporate Governance Quality? Evidence From the Blockholdings of the Korean National Pension Service
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Do Institutional Investors Improve Corporate Governance Quality? Evidence From the Blockholdings of the Korean National Pension Service

机译：机构投资者是否完善了公司治理质量？来自韩国国家养老金服务块的证据

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摘要

Institutional investors dissatisfied with weak firm governance can directly or indirectly intervene in management to maximise profits. However, no study has investigated the effects of such interventions on corporate governance. This study therefore examines the effect of Korean National Pension Service blockholdings on firms' corporate governance quality in the Korean market. This setting is interesting because the market is dominated by chaebols, which have ineffective internal governance mechanisms. We find that blockholdings reduce corporate governance quality under various endogeneity checks and empirical models; this finding in an emerging market implies that regulatory authorities should support institutional blockholders' active market participation.
机译：对弱者治理不满意的机构投资者可以直接或间接地介入管理层以最大化利润。然而，没有研究调查了这种干预措施对公司治理的影响。因此，本研究探讨了韩国国家养老金服务阻止对韩国市场企业的公司治理质量的影响。这种环境很有趣，因为市场主要由Chaebols主导，这具有无效的内部治理机制。我们发现阻止块在各种外部检查和经验模型下减少了公司治理质量;在新兴市场中的这种发现意味着监管机构应该支持机构阻止者的积极市场参与。

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