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Stable Rules for Electing Committees and Divergence on Outcomes

机译：选举委员会的稳定规则和结果分歧

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摘要

For three-candidate elections, this paper focuses on the relationships that exist between three stable rules for committee elections and the classical rules from which each of these stable rules are adapted. When selecting committees, a voting rule is said to be stable if it always elects a fixed-size subset of candidates such that there is no candidate in this set that is majority dominated by a candidate outside (BarberA and Coelho in Soc Choice Welfare 31:79-96, 2008; Coelho in Understanding, evaluating and selecting voting rules through games and axioms, 2004). There are some cases where a committee selected by a stable rule may differ from the committee made by the best candidates of the corresponding classical rule from which this stable rule is adapted. We call this the divergence on outcomes. We characterize all the voting situations under which this event is likely to occur. We also evaluate the likelihood of this event using the impartial anonymous culture assumption. As a consequence of our analysis, we highlight a strong connection between three Condorcet consistent rules: the Dodgson rule, the Maximin rule and the Young rule.
机译：对于三候选人的选举，本文着重于三个稳定的委员会选举规则与经典规则之间的关系，每个稳定规则都适用于这些规则。选择委员会时，如果投票规则总是选择一个固定大小的候选人子集，以使该集合中没有候选人由外部候选人占多数，则该投票规则被认为是稳定的（Soc Choice Welfare 31中的BarberA和Coelho： 79-96，2008； Coelho，《通过游戏和公理理解，评估和选择投票规则》，2004年）。在某些情况下，由稳定规则选出的委员会可能与相应经典规则的最佳候选者所组成的委员会有所不同，而该经典规则是从该候选规则中改编而来的。我们称此为结果差异。我们描述了可能发生此事件的所有投票情况。我们还使用公正的匿名文化假设来评估此事件的可能性。作为我们分析的结果，我们强调了三个Condorcet一致规则之间的紧密联系：道奇森规则，马克西姆规则和杨格规则。

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