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首页> 外文期刊>Group decision and negotiation >(Un)expected Bidder Behavior in Spectrum Auctions: About Inconsistent Bidding and Its Impact on Efficiency in the Combinatorial Clock Auction
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(Un)expected Bidder Behavior in Spectrum Auctions: About Inconsistent Bidding and Its Impact on Efficiency in the Combinatorial Clock Auction

机译：频谱拍卖中的（未）预期的出价人行为：关于组合时钟拍卖中的不一致出价及其对效率的影响

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摘要

The combinatorial clock auction is a two-stage auction format, which has been used to sell spectrum licenses worldwide in the recent years. It draws on a number of elegant ideas inspired by economic theory. A revealed preference activity rule should provide incentives to bid straightforward, i.e., consistent with the bidders' valuations on a payoff-maximizing package, in each round of the clock phase. A second-price rule should set incentives to bid truthfully in both phases. If bidders respond to these incentives and bid straightforward in the clock phase and truthful in the second sealed-bid stage, then the auction is fully efficient. Unfortunately, bidders might neither bid straightforward in the clock phase nor truthful on all packages in the second sealed-bid stage due to strategic reasons or practical limitations. We introduce metrics based on Afriat's Efficiency Index to analyze straightforward bidding and report on empirical data from the lab and from the field in the British 4G auction in 2013 and the Canadian 700 MHz auction in 2014, where the bids were made public. The data provides evidence that bidders deviate significantly from straightforward bidding in the clock phase, which can restrict the bids they can submit in the supplementary phase. We show that such restrictions can have a significant negative impact on efficiency and revenue.
机译：组合时钟拍卖是一种分为两个阶段的拍卖形式，近年来已被用于在全球范围内出售频谱许可。它借鉴了受经济理论启发的许多优雅思想。披露的偏好活动规则应提供激励措施，以在每个时钟阶段的每一轮中直接进行出价，即与出价最大化的软件包上的出价方的估值相一致。二级价格规则应设置激励措施，以在两个阶段中如实竞标。如果投标者对这些激励措施做出反应，并且在时钟阶段直接出价，而在第二次密封竞标阶段则是真实出价，那么拍卖就是完全有效的。不幸的是，由于战略原因或实际限制，投标人可能既不能在钟表阶段直接出价，也不能在第二次密封竞标阶段就所有包裹真实地出价。我们引入基于Afriat效率指数的指标来分析简单的竞标，并报告实验室和来自实地的经验数据，该数据来自2013年英国4G拍卖和2014年加拿大700 MHz拍卖，并在该拍卖中被公开。数据提供了证据，证明投标人在时钟阶段明显偏离直接投标，这可能会限制他们可以在补充阶段提交的投标。我们表明，此类限制可能会对效率和收入产生重大负面影响。

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