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Fair-efficient call admission control policies for broadband networks-a game theoretic framework

机译:博弈论框架的宽带网络公平高效的呼叫接纳控制策略

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A fundamental problem in connection oriented multiservice networks (ATM and STM) is finding the optimal policy for call acceptance. One seeks an admission control policy that efficiently utilizes network resources while at the same time being fair to the various call classes being supported. The theory of cooperative games provides a natural and precise framework for formulating such multicriterion problems as well as solution concepts. The authors describe how this framework can be used for analysis and synthesis of call admission strategies in broadband networks. In particular they investigate the Nash (1950), Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky (Raiffa, 1953; Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975), and modified Thomson (Cao, 1982) arbitration solutions from game theory. The performance of all solutions is evaluated by applying the value iteration algorithm from Markov decision theory. The approach is illustrated on a one-link network example for which the exact solutions can be achieved. The results indicate that the arbitration schemes from game theory provide some attractive features especially when compared to traditional control objectives: blocking equalization and traffic maximization. The authors also compare the optimal solutions with some simplified policies belonging to four different classes: complete sharing, coordinate convex, trunk reservation, and dynamic trunk reservation. The comparison indicates that in many cases, the trunk reservation and dynamic trunk reservation policies can provide fair, efficient solutions, close to the optimal ones.
机译:面向连接的多服务网络(ATM和STM)中的一个基本问题是找到呼叫接受的最佳策略。人们寻求一种准入控制策略,该策略有效利用网络资源,同时对所支持的各种呼叫类别公平。合作博弈的理论提供了一个自然而精确的框架,用于制定此类多准则问题以及解决方案概念。作者描述了如何将该框架用于宽带网络中呼叫接纳策略的分析和综合。特别是,他们研究了纳什(1950),拉菲娅·卡莱·斯莫罗汀斯基(Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky,1953;拉伊·卡莱和斯莫罗汀斯基(Kalai and Smorodinsky),1975),并从博弈论出发修改了汤姆森(Cao,1982)的仲裁解决方案。通过应用马尔可夫决策理论的值迭代算法评估所有解决方案的性能。在单链路网络示例中说明了该方法,可以针对该示例实现精确的解决方案。结果表明,基于博弈论的仲裁方案具有一些吸引人的功能,特别是与传统控制目标相比:阻塞均衡和流量最大化。作者还将最佳解决方案与属于四个不同类别的一些简化策略进行了比较:完全共享,协调凸面,主干保留和动态主干保留。比较表明,在许多情况下,中继线保留和动态中继线保留策略可以提供接近最佳解决方案的公平,有效的解决方案。

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