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首页> 外文期刊>IEEE systems journal >A Framework for Modeling and Structural Vulnerability Analysis of Spatial Cyber-Physical Power Systems From an Attack–Defense Perspective
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A Framework for Modeling and Structural Vulnerability Analysis of Spatial Cyber-Physical Power Systems From an Attack–Defense Perspective

机译：一种攻击防范观点的空间网络物理电力系统的建模与结构脆弱性分析框架

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摘要

This article provides a framework for modeling and analysis of spatial cyber-physical power systems (CPPSs). Previous studies on structural vulnerability analysis of CPPS mainly focused on network topology without any spatial information. In this article, we first propose a hierarchical information system evolution model for spatial power grids. Then, a spatial CPPS model is established by combining power and information systems that accounts for overlapped power and information lines. Finally, the structural vulnerability under global and localized failures is investigated based on direct current (dc) power flow. Under global failures, different types of components have distinguishing effects, and the power-node failure is the most serious case. For localized failures, key zones can be identified by the cascading failure scale, and similarly, different failure modes affect different areas. Furthermore, considering power system scenarios with only defenders and those with both attackers and defenders, we investigate two resource allocation situations. For defenders, increased resources and appropriately dispersed allocation can work effectively. However, in the attack-defense scenario, the perfect subgame equilibrium suggests that both attackers and defenders must concentrate all their resources on the most vulnerable zone. These findings may establish a foundation for future efforts to model and protect spatial CPPSs.
机译：本文提供了空间网络物理电力系统（CPPS）的建模和分析框架。以前关于CPP的结构漏洞分析的研究主要集中在没有任何空间信息的网络拓扑上。在本文中，我们首先提出了一种用于空间电网的分层信息系统演化模型。然后，通过组合用于重叠的功率和信息线的功率和信息系统来建立空间CPP模型。最后，基于直流（DC）功率流来研究全局和局部故障下的结构漏洞。在全局故障下，不同类型的组件具有显着效果，并且功率节点故障是最严重的情况。对于本地化故障，可以通过级联失败量表来识别密钥区域，并且类似地，不同的故障模式影响不同的区域。此外，考虑到只有捍卫者和攻击者和防御者的电力系统场景，我们调查了两个资源分配情况。对于捍卫者来说，增加的资源和适当分散的分配可以有效地工作。然而，在攻击防御方案中，完美的子级均衡表明，攻击者和防守者都必须将所有资源集中在最脆弱的区域。这些调查结果可以为未来努力建立模拟和保护空间CPPS的基础。

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