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Bid and Time Truthful Online Auctions in Dynamic Spectrum Markets

机译：动态频谱市场中真实的出价和时间在线拍卖

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摘要

The allocation of underutilized spectrum from primary users to secondary users in real time is likely the most promising avenue for advancing efficiency of spectrum use given the ever-increasing demand for transmission. Research in this area has focused on auctions to facilitate the distribution of spectrum, inducing truthful reporting by participants. However, most research has assumed a static or partially dynamic setting. These approaches are unable to capture that spectrum becomes available at random intervals as primary users’ needs vary across time; and, similarly, secondary users’ needs vary over time. Moreover, frequently there is flexibility regarding the time of transmission—with some transmissions being more urgent and time-sensitive than others. Therefore, existing research cannot be directly applied to such auction environments involving users with variable transmission deadlines, while preserving efficiency and truthfulness. In this paper, we present two truthful online auction mechanisms in dynamic spectrum markets that consider indefinite number of arrival of bidders with varying transmission deadlines and random availability of spectrum units over time. The first proposed mechanism SOADE assumes that the underlying distribution information of bidders and supplies is available. With that knowledge, the mechanism builds around a priority function that determines the rank of a bidder of winning spectrum at an auction considering its valuation, deadline, and uncertainty associated with dynamic arrival of bidders and spectrum availability. The second proposed mechanism xSOADE does not require any distribution knowledge. This mechanism applies bid monotonic spectrum allocation technique, determines the payment based on critical pricing, and enforces penalty rules to avoid manipulation. We prove that both the algorithms are truthful against bid and time-based cheating and individually rational through theoretical analysis and numerical simulations. Finally, we analyze the performance of these algorithms under different settings in terms of auction efficiency and auction revenue and demonstrate their effectiveness compared to prior work.
机译：考虑到传输需求的不断增长，实时将未充分利用的频谱从主要用户实时分配到次要用户可能是提高频谱使用效率的最有希望的途径。该领域的研究集中于拍卖，以促进频谱的分布，促使参与者如实汇报。但是，大多数研究都假设静态或部分动态的设置。由于主要用户的需求随时间变化，因此这些方法无法捕捉到频谱以随机间隔可用。同样，二级用户的需求也会随时间而变化。此外，传输时间通常具有灵活性，某些传输比其他传输更紧急且对时间更敏感。因此，现有研究不能直接应用于涉及具有可变传输截止日期的用户的拍卖环境，同时又不能保持效率和真实性。在本文中，我们介绍了动态频谱市场中的两种真实的在线拍卖机制，它们考虑了随着传输截止时间的变化和频谱单位随时间的随机可用性而出现的不确定的投标人数量。首先提出的机制SOADE假定投标者和供应品的基础分配信息可用。有了这些知识，该机制将围绕优先级函数构建，该优先级函数将考虑竞标者的估值，截止日期以及与竞标者动态到达和频谱可用性相关的不确定性，确定拍卖中获胜者的排名。第二种建议的机制xSOADE不需要任何分配知识。该机制应用出价单调频谱分配技术，基于关键定价确定付款，并执行罚款规则以避免操纵。通过理论分析和数值模拟，我们证明这两种算法对基于投标和基于时间的作弊都是真实的，并且是合理的。最后，我们根据拍卖效率和拍卖收入分析了这些算法在不同设置下的性能，并证明了它们与先前工作相比的有效性。

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