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Camouflage Traffic: Minimizing Message Delay for Smart Grid Applications under Jamming

机译:伪装流量:最小化干扰下智能电网应用的消息延迟

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摘要

Smart grid is a cyber-physical system that integrates power infrastructures with information technologies. To facilitate efficient information exchange, wireless networks have been proposed to be widely used in the smart grid. However, the jamming attack that constantly broadcasts radio interference is a primary security threat to prevent the deployment of wireless networks in the smart grid. Hence, spread spectrum systems, which provide jamming resilience via multiple frequency and code channels, must be adapted to the smart grid for secure wireless communications, while at the same time providing latency guarantee for control messages. An open question is how to minimize message delay for timely smart grid communication under any potential jamming attack. To address this issue, we provide a paradigm shift from the methodology, which is widely used in existing works to investigate well-adopted attack models, to the methodology, which offers delay performance guarantee for smart grid applications under any attack. We first define a generic jamming process that characterizes a wide range of existing attack models. Then, we show that in all strategies under the generic process, the worst-case message delay is a U-shaped function of network traffic load. This indicates that, interestingly, increasing a fair amount of traffic can in fact improve the worst-case delay performance. As a result, we demonstrate a lightweight yet promising system, transmitting adaptive camouflage traffic (TACT), to combat jamming attacks. TACT minimizes the message delay by generating extra traffic called to balance the network load at the optimum. Experiments show that TACT can decrease the probability that a message is not delivered on time in order of magnitude.
机译:智能电网是将电力基础设施与信息技术集成在一起的网络物理系统。为了促进有效的信息交换,已经提出了在智能电网中广泛使用无线网络。但是,不断广播无线电干扰的干扰攻击是防止在智能电网中部署无线网络的主要安全威胁。因此,通过多个频率和代码信道提供抗干扰能力的扩频系统必须适合于智能电网以进行安全的无线通信,同时为控制消息提供等待时间保证。一个悬而未决的问题是如何在任何潜在的干扰攻击下最大程度地减少消息延迟,以便及时进行智能电网通信。为了解决这个问题,我们提供了一种范式转变,从在现有工作中广泛使用的方法来研究采用良好的攻击模型的方法论向方法论转变,该方法论为智能电网应用程序在任何攻击下的延迟性能提供了保证。我们首先定义一个通用的干扰过程,该过程表征了广泛的现有攻击模型。然后,我们表明在通用过程下的所有策略中,最坏情况下的消息延迟是网络流量负载的U形函数。有趣的是,这表明增加一定数量的流量实际上可以改善最坏情况下的延迟性能。结果,我们展示了一种轻量级但很有前途的系统,可传输自适应伪装流量(TACT),以应对干扰攻击。 TACT通过生成称为平衡网络负载的最佳流量的额外流量,将消息延迟最小化。实验表明,TACT可以按大小顺序降低未按时传递消息的可能性。

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