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首页> 外文期刊>Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on >Designing Socially-Optimal Rating Protocols for Crowdsourcing Contest Dilemma
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Designing Socially-Optimal Rating Protocols for Crowdsourcing Contest Dilemma

机译：设计众包竞赛困境的社会最优评分协议

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摘要

Despite the increasing popularity and the perceived promise of crowdsourcing, its openness presents individuals with an opportunity to exhibit antisocial behavior, such as free-ride and attack to decrease the social welfare, which is considered as a crowdsourcing contest dilemma. Hence, incentive mechanisms are needed to compel rational and selfish individuals to contribute well behavior in tasks. In this paper, we integrate the pricing and reputation schemes to design a novel socially optimal rating protocol based on game theory, in which each player is tagged with a rating to represent its social status, and players are encouraged to contribute good behaviors to increase their ratings, thus receive higher rewards. In particular, we analyze how the players’ behaviors are influenced by the incurred costs and the designed payment, as well as their long-term utilities. By quantifying the sufficient and necessary conditions under which all players comply with the social norm in their self-interests, we formulate the rating protocol design problem, and analyze the impacts of the design parameters in order to characterize the optimal design, that maximizes the social welfare to achieve the social optimum. Finally, illustrative results show the validity and effectiveness of our proposed protocol design for crowdsourcing contest dilemma.
机译：尽管众包越来越受欢迎并且被认为是有前途的，但它的开放性为个人提供了展现反社会行为的机会，例如搭便车和攻击以减少社会福利，这被认为是众包竞赛的两难选择。因此，需要激励机制来迫使理性和自私的人在工作中做出良好的行为。在本文中，我们结合定价和声誉计划，设计了一种基于博弈论的新型社会最优评分协议，其中，每个玩家都用一个评分来代表其社会地位，并鼓励玩家做出良好的举止以提高他们的行为。评级，从而获得更高的奖励。特别是，我们分析了玩家的行为如何受到所产生的费用和设计的支付以及他们的长期效用的影响。通过量化所有参与者满足其自身利益的社会规范的充分和必要条件，我们制定了评级协议设计问题，并分析了设计参数的影响以表征最佳设计，从而最大化了社会福利以实现社会最优。最后，说明性结果表明了我们提出的协议设计在众包竞赛中的有效性和有效性。

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