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首页> 外文期刊>IEEE transactions on information forensics and security >Security Assurance for System-on-Chip Designs With Untrusted IPs
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Security Assurance for System-on-Chip Designs With Untrusted IPs

机译：具有不受信任的IP的片上系统设计的安全性保证

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摘要

Modern system-on-chip (SoC) designs involve integration of a large number of intellectual property (IP) blocks, many of which are acquired from untrusted third-party vendors. An IP containing a security vulnerability—whether inadvertent or malicious—may compromise the trustworthiness of the entire SoC, e.g., by leaking sensitive information or causing execution failures at key points. Existing functional validation approaches, post-manufacturing tests, and IP trust verification techniques are inadequate to accomplish comprehensive system-level security assurance in the presence of untrusted IPs. In this paper, we analyze security issues at the SoC level caused by untrusted IPs. We also propose a novel, resilient SoC security architecture to ensure trusted SoC operation with untrusted IPs. Our architecture realizes fine-grained IP-trust aware security policies in an efficient security policy checker that enables run-time monitoring of security issues arising from untrusted IPs. It also exploits on-chip design-for-debug architecture to ensure trusted information flow from IP blocks to the security policy checker. Unlike existing solutions to the untrusted IP problem, which rely on verification of IP trust before they are integrated into an SoC, the proposed approach follows a fundamentally different architecture-level solution based on run-time resilience. We demonstrate the effectiveness of this framework for system protection using several illustrative practical use cases. We also provide experimental results to show that the overhead of the proposed architecture is modest on representative SoC designs.
机译：现代的片上系统（SoC）设计涉及大量知识产权（IP）块的集成，其中许多是从不受信任的第三方供应商处获得的。包含安全漏洞（无论是无意的还是恶意的）的IP可能会损害整个SoC的可信度，例如，通过泄漏敏感信息或在关键点导致执行失败。现有的功能验证方法，制造后测试和IP信任验证技术不足以在存在不受信任的IP的情况下完成全面的系统级安全保证。在本文中，我们分析了由不可信IP引起的SoC级别的安全问题。我们还提出了一种新颖的，具有弹性的SoC安全体系结构，以确保使用不受信任的IP进行受信任的SoC操作。我们的体系结构在高效的安全策略检查器中实现了细粒度的IP信任感知安全策略，可对不可信IP引起的安全问题进行运行时监视。它还利用片上调试设计架构来确保可信信息从IP块流到安全策略检查器。与不信任IP问题的现有解决方案不同（该解决方案在将IP集成到SoC中之前就依赖于IP信任的验证），所提出的方法遵循基于运行时弹性的根本不同的体系结构级解决方案。我们使用几个说明性的实际用例证明了该框架对系统保护的有效性。我们还提供了实验结果，表明在具有代表性的SoC设计中，所提出体系结构的开销是适度的。

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