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首页> 外文期刊>IEEE transactions on information forensics and security >Stealthy Control Signal Attacks in Linear Quadratic Gaussian Control Systems: Detectability Reward Tradeoff
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Stealthy Control Signal Attacks in Linear Quadratic Gaussian Control Systems: Detectability Reward Tradeoff

机译：线性二次高斯控制系统中的隐身控制信号攻击：可检测性奖励权衡

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摘要

The problem of false data injection through compromised cyber links to a physical control system modeled by linear quadratic Gaussian dynamics is studied in this paper. The control input stream is compromised by an attacker who modifies the (cyber) control signals transmitted with the objective of increasing the quadratic cost incurred by the (physical) controller whilst maintaining a degree of stealthiness. The tradeoff between the increase in quadratic cost and the stealthiness (or detectability), are measured by the Kullback–Leibler distance between legitimate and falsified state dynamics is characterized analytically. It is shown that the optimal adversarial strategy is a sequence of independent Gaussian noise signals with carefully chosen variances whose eigenvalues align with those of the legitimate noise covariance with the scaling reflecting the desired quadratic cost increase. As the stealthiness decreases, the optimal tradeoff is shown to be linear with slope inversely proportional to the maximal of maximal eigenvalue of modified reward matrices. Numerical simulations are presented that showcase the optimal tradeoff and the comparison of the legitimate and falsified dynamics under different requirements on detectability.
机译：本文研究了通过折衷的网络链接将虚假数据注入到以线性二次高斯动力学建模的物理控制系统中的问题。攻击者破坏了控制输入流，攻击者修改了所发送的（网络）控制信号，目的是增加（物理）控制器所引起的二次成本，同时保持一定程度的隐身性。二次成本的增加与隐身性（或可检测性）之间的折衷通过分析合法状态和伪造状态动力学之间的Kullback-Leibler距离来衡量。结果表明，最佳对抗策略是一系列独立的高斯噪声信号，这些信号具有经过精心选择的方差，其特征值与合法噪声协方差的特征值对齐，并且缩放比例反映了所需的二次成本增加。随着隐身性的降低，最佳折衷方案显示为线性，且斜率与修改后的奖励矩阵的最大特征值的最大值成反比。提出了数值模拟，展示了最佳的权衡以及在可检测性的不同要求下合法和伪造动力学的比较。

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