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首页> 外文期刊>Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on >Designing Secure and Dependable Mobile Sensing Mechanisms With Revenue Guarantees
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Designing Secure and Dependable Mobile Sensing Mechanisms With Revenue Guarantees

机译：设计具有收入保证的安全可靠的移动传感机制

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摘要

In many existing incentive-based mobile sensing applications, the sensing job owner runs an auction with the mobile phone users to maximize its purchased sensing resource. We notice that both the mobile phone users and the job owner could behave dishonestly to pursue their own interests. This motivates us to design secure and dependable auction mechanisms that generate the correct, promising output even when both of them could cheat. In particular, in this paper, we consider a general auction in which a buyer, who acts as the auctioneer, purchases the resource under a limited budget from a group of sellers who act as the bidders. Considering bidders’ privacy and their limited computing capacity, we construct our mechanisms by integrating the innovative game theoretical techniques, logic deductions, and efficient cryptographic operations. Our mechanisms are not only proved to be strategy-proof against dishonest bidders in the sense that they are incentivized to bid their private types truthfully, but also enable all the bidders to efficiently verify the correctness of the auction’s outcome, that is computed by the auctioneer, without revealing their private types to each other. Meanwhile, our mechanisms are proved to have the theoretical guarantee that the auctioneer/buyer’s expected revenue (i.e. the amount of service it acquires after the auction) is no less than a certain portion of the optimal revenue that the auctioneer can acquire when it knows all the bidders’ types at no cost. Our extensive evaluations show that our mechanisms achieve good performance in terms of the revenue maximization and their efficiency.
机译：在许多现有的基于激励的移动感应应用程序中，感应作业所有者与移动电话用户进行拍卖，以最大化其购买的感应资源。我们注意到，手机用户和老板都可能不诚实地追求自己的利益。这促使我们设计安全可靠的拍卖机制，即使它们都可能作弊，它们也可以产生正确的，有希望的输出。特别是，在本文中，我们考虑了一个普通拍卖，在该拍卖中，作为拍卖人的买方从有限的预算中从作为投标人的一组卖方购买资源。考虑到投标人的隐私及其有限的计算能力，我们通过整合创新的博弈论技术，逻辑推论和有效的密码运算来构建我们的机制。我们的机制不仅被证明可以对付不诚实的竞标者，而且可以激励他们如实地竞标其私有类型，而且还可以使所有竞标者有效地验证由拍卖人计算出的拍卖结果的正确性，而不会彼此透露自己的私有类型。同时，我们的机制被证明具有理论上的保证，即拍卖人/买方的预期收入（即拍卖后所获得的服务量）不低于当拍卖人知道所有情况时可获得的最佳收入的一部分。投标人的类型是免费的。我们的广泛评估表明，我们的机制在收益最大化及其效率方面取得了良好的绩效。

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