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首页> 外文期刊>IEICE Transactions on Communications >A Game-Theoretic Approach for Opportunistic Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio Networks with Incomplete Information
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A Game-Theoretic Approach for Opportunistic Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio Networks with Incomplete Information

机译：信息不完全的认知无线电网络中机会频谱共享的博弈论方法

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摘要

One important issue in cognitive transmission is for multiple secondary users to dynamically acquire spare spectrum from the single primary user. The existing spectrum sharing scheme adopts a deterministic Cournot game to formulate this problem, of which the solution is the Nash equilibrium. This formulation is based on two implicit assumptions. First, each secondary user is willing to fully exchange transmission parameters with all others and hence knows their complete information. Second, the unused spectrum of the primary user for spectrum sharing is always larger than the total frequency demand of all secondary users at the Nash equilibrium. However, both assumptions may not be true in general. To remedy this, the present paper considers a more realistic assumption of incomplete information, i.e., each secondary user may choose to conceal their private information for achieving higher transmission benefit. Following this assumption and given that the unused bandwidth of the primary user is large enough, we adopt a probabilistic Cournot game to formulate an opportunistic spectrum sharing scheme for maximizing the total benefit of all secondary users. Bayesian equilibrium is considered as the solution of this game. Moreover, we prove that a secondary user can improve their expected benefit by actively hiding its transmission parameters and increasing their variance. On the other hand, when the unused spectrum of the primary user is smaller than the maximal total frequency demand of all secondary users at the Bayesian equilibrium, we formulate a constrained optimization problem for the primary user to maximize its profit in spectrum sharing and revise the proposed spectrum sharing scheme to solve this problem heuris-tically. This provides a unified approach to overcome the aforementioned two limitations of the existing spectrum sharing scheme.
机译：认知传输中的一个重要问题是多个次要用户从单个主要用户动态获取备用频谱。现有的频谱共享方案采用确定性的古诺博弈来解决这个问题，其解决方案是纳什均衡。该表述基于两个隐式假设。首先，每个次要用户都愿意与其他所有用户完全交换传输参数，因此知道他们的完整信息。第二，主要用户未使用的频谱共享总是大于纳什均衡时所有次要用户的总频率需求。但是，这两个假设通常可能都不正确。为了解决这个问题，本文考虑了不完整信息的更现实的假设，即每个二级用户可以选择隐瞒其私人信息以获得更高的传输利益。根据这个假设，并假设主要用户的未使用带宽足够大，我们采用概率古诺（Cournot）游戏来制定机会频谱共享方案，以最大化所有次要用户的总利益。贝叶斯均衡被认为是该博弈的解。此外，我们证明，二级用户可以通过主动隐藏其传输参数并增加其方差来提高其预期收益。另一方面，当主要用户的未使用频谱小于贝叶斯均衡时所有次要用户的最大总频率需求时，我们为主要用户制定了一个约束优化问题，以最大化其在频谱共享中的利润，并修改提出了一种频谱共享方案来解决这个问题。这提供了一种统一的方法来克服现有频谱共享方案的上述两个限制。

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  • 来源
    《IEICE Transactions on Communications》 |2012年第4期|p.1117-1124|共8页
  • 作者

    Xuesong Jonathan TAN; Liang LI; Wei GUO;

  • 作者单位

    National Key Lab of Science and Technology on Communications, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, P.R. China;

    National Key Lab of Science and Technology on Communications, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, P.R. China;

    National Key Lab of Science and Technology on Communications, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, P.R. China;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    cognitive radio; spectrum sharing; game theory; nash equilibrium; bayesian equilibrium;

    机译：认知无线电频谱共享;博弈论纳什均衡贝叶斯均衡;

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